Foundations of Cryptography Prof. Dr. Ashish Choudhury (Former) Infosys Foundation Career Development Chair Professor Indian Institute of Technology – Bangalore Lecture – 30 Generic Attacks on Hash Functions and Additional Applications Hello everyone, welcome to this lecture. Just a quick recap. In the last lecture, we had seen how to use collision-resistant hash function to create message authentication codes for arbitrary long messages. (Refer Slide Time: 00:31) So, the plan for this lecture is as follows. In this lecture, we will discuss birthday attacks, which is a class of generic attacks which can be launched against any hash functions and we will also discuss the small space birthday attacks for finding collisions in hash functions, and finally, we will discuss some of the other applications of hash functions apart from the message authentication codes. (Refer Slide Time: 01:03)So let us start with birthday attacks for finding collisions. So, imagine you are given a deterministic hash function which is publicly known. Then the naive algorithm for finding collision in this hash function is as follows: you can evaluate this hash function at 2l+1 number of distinct inputs and it is guaranteed that with 100% success you will obtain a collision. The success probability of finding the collision here is 1. This is because of the pigeonhole principle because at the best you can hope that 2l distinct inputs go to 2l distinct outputs, but since you are evaluating a hash function at more input than 2l inputs, then definitely there will be 2 inputs which will be giving you the same hash value and that will give you collision. So, the success probability of this naïve collision finding algorithm is 1, it gives you 100% success guarantee, but unfortunately the running time of this naive algorithm is of order to 2l and if l is significantly large, then of course this naïve collision finding algorithm is impractical. So now let us see a generalization of this naive algorithm and the generalization goes as follows: you evaluate this hash function at q distinct inputs, which I denote by x1 ,… xq and you obtain the hash values and you pass these (input, output) values and check whether exists a pair (xi, xj) such that your hash values are same. Now, we are interested to argue here what is the success probability of this generalized algorithm? So, remember if q is said to be 2l+1, then basically this generalized algorithm becomes a naive algorithm in that that case, the success probability is 1, but now your q need not be 2l+1. it could be any function and now our goal is to analyze the success probability of this naive algorithm as a function of q and the size of your hash function. So, while doing the analysis, what we will assume is that we will assume that the function H is behaving like a truly random function, and why so because that is the best you can hope for. Because if indeed your function H behaves like a truly random function, then that is the most difficult task for the adversary where the adversary’s goal there will be to find a collision. Because it can be proved that the probability of finding collision for this generalized algorithm gets better if your underlying function H is a non-random function and if instead of querying on distinct inputs x1 to xq, your algorithm makes queries for random set of x values. So, we are basically not making any stronger assumption by assuming that the function H is a random function because the success probability of this naive algorithm is lower bounded by the success probability that this naive algorithm which will give you the case where we are assuming your underlying function H is a random function. (Refer Slide Time: 04:30) So, let us set the setting for the generalized case here. So, you are given a truly random function from the set of binary strings to a fixed set domain where the size of the domain is L and say you have made q number of queries for this hash values on distinct inputs x1 to xq and the corresponding output values are y1 to yq. Since I am assuming my hash function is a random function, each of this yi values are uniformly random values from the set of N values which my hash function can throw as possible outputs.I denote the event Coll(q, N), the event that event that = , where ≠My goal is to compute a lower bound on the probability of this event Coll(q, N). So, I want to prove here that if the number of queries that I am making here is upper bounded by , then Pr[Coll(, )] ≥((−1))/4. Let us see how we can derive this. So, let me denote the event NoColli to be the event when we made the first i queries, all the hash output values are distinct, that means the values y1, y2, yi are all distinct. That is the case that means H(x1), H(x2), … H(xi), they are all distinct and no collision has occurred and that is the event NoColli. It is easy to see that since we are making q number of queries, then the event because if the event NoCollq occurs that means all your y values y1, y2, yq are distinct and that means there exists no collision, which I obtained by running by a generalized algorithm. So now it is easy to see that by applying simple rules of probability, we obtain the probability that event Pr[NoCollq] = Pr[NoColl1] * Pr[NoColl2 | NoColl1].. Pr[NoCollq | NoCollq-1]. That means the first q-1 queries give you a distinct output, what is the probability that event when you make the q th query, there exists still no collision. If I multiply all these probabilities, I obtain the probability of the event NoCollq. So let us calculate each of the probabilities that are there in your right hand side. So it is easy to see clearly that the event NoColl1 occurs with probability 1 because when you are making your first query, definitely no collision has occurred. That means y1 is distinct. So I can simply turn off this, ignore this probability because that is 1. Now let us compute the ith term in the expression on your right-hand side. Namely, let us compute the probability Pr[NoColli+1 | NoColli]. That means your event is the following: your y1 ≠ y2 ….≠yi are all distinct that is given to you and then when you have made the query for xi+1, you have obtained yi+1 and we want to analyze what is the probability that is yi+1 is different from all the values y1 to yi. It is not difficult to see that this probability is nothing but 1-i+1, why? Because 1 –i/N denotes the probability with which this i+1th value could be same as at least one of these i values and if you subtract that quantity from 1 that gives you the required probability, and I can always replace this 1 - i/N by e -i/N and this comes from your basic inequality from the fact that 1-x can be always upper bounded by e -x for all x. So now I know the value of each of the terms in my right hand side that is what I have derived. So what I have to do is I have to just substitute here. So, I obtained that the probability that the event NoCollq occurs is the product of these entities and if I take the product in the exponent, basically I end up doing the summation in the exponent. So, I obtained that even NoColli occurs with this much probability, and if I take the summation inside, I obtain that this is less than equal to e -q* (q-1)/2N and then I can finally replace it by this inequality. This is because q* (q-1)/2N is less than N because I am making the assumption that q is upper bounded by a square root of 2N. If that is the case, then indeed q* (q-1)/2N is less than N, and if that is the case, then I can use the fact that e to the power -x is less than equal to (1- x)/2. So by making using all these facts and doing the substitutions and solving the inequalities, I obtained that the event NoColl occurs with this much probability, but that is not our goal. Our goal is to compute the probability of the event Coll(q, N) to occur and since the event called NoCollq and the complimentary event Coll(q, N) are related by this. We simply obtained that the probability of the event Coll(q, N) to occur is at least q *(q-1)/ 4N. (Refer Slide Time: 10:38) So that is the lower bound we have established here assuming that your function H is a random function and we have evaluated the function H at q distinct x values, and we have established that the probability of the collision is at least as much. Now you might be wondering that why this generic algorithm for finding the collision is called or is given a fancy name birthday attack. Basically, this is due to the fact that whatever analysis we have done you can model is as of following computer science problem. Imagine that you have a set of q people sitting in a room who are the random set of people, and each of them has a birthday. So, you can imagine that the function H here is nothing but it is a function which maps the people to their birthdays and we assume that the birthdays of the people fall in a non-leap year. So the number of candidate’s birthdays which those people could have is 365 possible values. So, you have q number of people, say person 1, person 2, and person q and their birthdays are H(P1), H(P2), H(P3) and so on. We want to find out what is the probability that among those q people, there exist at least 2 people who have the same birthday. I am not interested in the year, even I am not arguing the day. I do not require that they should have said same year of birth as well. I am just interested whether they have the same birthday or not and you can imagine that the function H here is mapping those people to birthdays. So, it turns out that whatever analysis we have done here in the context of hash function, it could be carried out even in the context of this birthday problem and it could be proved that if there are 27 random people in the room, then the chance that at least 2 of them have the same birthday is approximately 50%, so which is a good enough probability. You do not require a large number of people to ensure that with good probability 2 people have the same birthday. So coming back to the context of cryptographic hash functions, so what exactly are the implications of this birthday attack? It says that imagine that your co-domain space is 2l . That means your hash outputs could be any string of l bits, then what is the analysis of the birthday attack basically says is that if you evaluate your hash function at these many number of distinct inputs, namely 2l+1 over 2 number of distinct inputs. If I substitute this value of q here in this expression and the value of n to be 2l , then I find that the probability of the collision turns out to be a constant independent of the size of l and a constant success probability is a good enough probability for an adversary to find collision in your underlying hash function in a polynomial time. That means your value of l has to be significantly large because if you ensure that your value of l is significantly large that means to make these many number of queries, the adversary has to do an impractical amount of computation and that will rule out the implications of birthday attack. Theoretically, the implications are still there. It is only that we are going to operate our underlying hash with such a large value of l that carrying out these many number of hash evaluations is going to be impractical, and that is why a necessary condition for obtaining a collision-resistant hash function is that you should have a large value of l. Because if l is small, then just by making these many number of queries, adversary could come up with a collision with almost a constant success probability. So that is why the minimum value of l which is recommended for current practical instantiations of the hash functions is 256. Because if you set l to be 256, then basically adversary has to do computations of order 2 128 to obtain collisions with a constant Success probability, but 2 128 computations is really a huge amount of computation. (Refer Slide Time: 14:52) So now let us discuss another type of birthday attack, which we call as a small space birthday attack for finding the collision. The idea here remains the same. So, remember in the generalized collision finding algorithm, we evaluated the hash function at q number of distinct inputs, and we had to store all those hash values because when we are comparing the x input and your hash values to find out whether there exist a collision or not, we need all the (xi, xj) pairs and their corresponding hash values. It turns out that the space complexity here is of order q. So, if you consider in the modern computer systems, time is not an issue, the processing speed is not an issue, day by day the processing speed is increasing. What matters is the space complexity because space is really a very critical resource here and that is why what will be interesting here is whether we can carry out the birthday attack or the generalized birthday attack that we had seen earlier where the space complexity is not O(q), but rather say it is a constant? Now, you might be wondering that how can just by storing constant number of values, we can still perform an attack which is similar to the generalized attack that we had seen in the context of birthday attack. So, the idea behind this constant space complexity or a small space complexity birthday attack is as follows: imagine you have a sequence of values y1 to yq which are basically obtained by a sequence of a chain of hash evaluation. So, you will start with say a distinct or random y1 and then y2 is nothing but hash of y1 and then from this y2 I obtain y3 which is same as say hash of y2, which in turn is same as hash of hash of y1 and so on. So, you can imagine that I have a chain like this and each subsequent y value is related to the previous y value by the hash function H. So, that is how I have computed these y values. Now, we can prove that if you have 2 indices I and J such that your yI value and yJ values are same. That means you have this chain of values y1, y2, and say you have 2 indices intermediate indices yI and yJ and you have say done q number of such y computations and you have say 2 such indices yI and yJ such that yI and yJ are same. Then it means that there exist at least one index yi or one y value which I denote by yi such that yi and y y2i will be same that constitutes a collision for you. So that is a claim here okay. So, I am not going into the details of the proofs of this claim, but you have to believe me that if indeed we have computed y values like this and if we have this condition to be there to be true, then this condition holds as well. That gives you an idea of how to find a collision with a space complexity of constant. So, what you have to do is you have to perform the same analysis that you have done for the previous case, but now you just need to store 2 hash values. So, what you have to do is in each iteration, you have to compute the next y value. So you have to go from yi to yi+1 and at the same time, you have to keep a track of y2i as well. As soon as you obtain an index i such that yi and y2i are same. That means, there exists some collision in the sequence of y values that you have computed till y2i. So, what you have to do is basically then you have to do a backtracking and find out the exact collision. So, I stress that is this claim does not give you the guarantee that yi and y2i is exactly the collision because yi is obtained from the value H(yi-1) and y2i is obtained by evaluating y2i-1. So, it is not guaranteed that yi-1 and y2i-1 constitutes a collision. That is what you have to basically check by doing the backtracking. So, the interesting part here is that both for stage 1 as well as for stage 2, we just need to store 2 hash values. So, in stage 1, we can go in the forward direction and stop as soon as this condition holds and which will become true with very high probability, we can prove that, and if indeed this condition becomes true, we stop there and then we do a backtracking again by just keeping track of 2 hash values and we will end up finding the exact collision in the chain of values that we have got. The probability analysis more or less remains the same. So that is the idea behind a small space birthday attacks for finding collisions. (Refer Slide Time: 20:23) So now let us discuss some additional applications of collision-resistant hash function. So, the major application that we had discussed in the last lecture was constructing message authentication codes for arbitrary length inputs, but in this lecture, we will see some other applications as well. So, imagine you are given a collision-resistant hash function and the one of the main ideas that we can use in several applications involving the hash function is that the hash of a file can serve as its short unique identifier where the size of the identifier will be fixed, say l bits and its size would be l bits irrespective of what file you are feeding as an input to the hash value. It could be a small file, it could be a large file, I do not care. The digest of the file will be taken as an identifier and since we are assuming that your underlying hash function is collision resistant that means in practical amount of time, it will be very difficult to come up with 2 files, say X and X’ such that both of them give you the same digest. Because if that is the case, then this whole idea would not work, but since I am assuming that my underlying hash function is a collision-resistant hash function, then it means that in practical amount of time, it is very difficult to come up with 2 two files X and X’ having the same identifier or the same message digest and it turns out that this small concept you can use in several real world applications. So let us discuss a few of them. The first application that where we can use this idea is that of virus fingerprinting. So what we do here is that the anti-viruses or virus scanner stores the hashes of known viruses in their database and whenever we have an email attachment or we download an email application, and if we want to check whether the downloaded attachment or the download application has a virus or not. What we do is the virus scanner basically computes the hash of the downloaded attachment or the application and then it matches the hash with the known hashes of the viruses, which it has already stored in its database. If there is a match, then an error message is given to us that it suspect data attachment that we have obtained or the application that we have downloaded contains potential virus. Notice that it might be possible that you have an attachment which is a genuine attachment, but unfortunately its hash matches the hash of one of the known viruses. In that case, even for a genuine attachment, you might get an error message, but that implies that you are getting a collision, or you are finding a collision in a feasible amount of time.But since I am assuming that my underlying hash function is collision resistant, if at all an error message is given to me that means at very high probability indeed the hash of the attachment that I am downloading is containing viruses. (Refer Slide Time: 23:20) The second application where we can use this idea is that of the duplication and here the idea is that we want to eliminate duplicate copies of the same data. So, imagine that we are in a cloud storage scenario where say we have several users, user1, user2 and say n number of users and each of them are hiding a common cloud storage for uploading their data. Now, since the users are independent of each other, it might be possible that user1 and user2 end up uploading a same file. If the cloud storage naively gives or stores both the copies of X, then that will be a wastage of space. So what can be an interesting or smart solution will be every time a user tries to upload a file, what the cloud storage can do is it can compute a hash of the file for which the request has come and it can compare that hash value with all the hashes of the previous files that it has stored. If the hash value matches that means that the file which has been requested to be uploaded is already there in the cloud storage, so no need to again create a fresh copy of that file. So that is the idea of deduplication here, and again, we are using the idea of hashing the file and using the hash of the file as its identifier. (Refer Slide Time: 24:38)Now let us see some other applications of hash functions and this is what we call as hash pointers. So I am assuming that all of you are familiar with pointers in programming language. Basically, pointers are special type of variable or you can imagine that basically pointer variables points to a memory location where some data is stored. So if say 1884 is a memory location, and if I have a pointer variable, then in that pointer variable the address 1884 is stored. So by following the address you can or by following this pointer, you can come to the location 1884 and see what exactly is stored. Now this hash pointer is almost same as a pointer in spirit, but apart from pointing to the data, this pointer also stores the hash of the value that is stored in that location. That means if this is some data which is stored in some arbitrary location, and if I say that this is your hash pointer, then this hash pointer will have a pointer to the data as well as the hash of the data that is stored in that location. The advantage of this hash pointer is that by following this pointer, not only you can retrieve the data, so if you follow the pointer you can retrieve the data, and once the data is retrieved if you want to verify whether you have retrieved the right data or not, you can again hash it and compare it with the hash value which is stored along with this point. So that is advantage or the extra property which is available with the hash pointer compared to the traditional pointers. (Refer Slide Time: 26:10)Now it turns out that any data structure which we can design using the standard pointers in programming language, all of them can be redesigned by replacing the standard pointers using hash pointers. So for instance, this is your standard linked list where you have a collection of nodes and each node has some sequence of data of which we call as data block and a pointer to the next block, like this, so this is your last block, and since there is nothing after it, that is why the next pointer for it is set to be null. We have the previous block where we have the data and a pointer pointing to the next block and so on and like that we have the head pointer. So that is a standard linked list here, which I guess all of you might be aware of. What we now do is that we take the same linked list, but replace all the pointers by hash pointers. So, we have now a sequence of blocks here, each block will have its own data content and along with that instead of a regular pointer, we have a hash pointer, which will point to the block after it along with the hash of the data as well as the hash pointer stored here. So that means if I consider this hash pointer, it will point to the next node and when I say node, node means node as a whole that means the data concatenated with the hash pointer stored there. So this hash pointer will be pointing to this data block and along with that a hash of this whole block whole binary string, whole binary content that is kept here will be stored in this hash pointer. Now it turns out as soon as I take the standard linked list and replace all the pointers by hash pointers, I obtain a very nice data structure, which has a very fancy name in this today's world, namely Block chain.So, if someone ask you what exactly is a Block chain? Block chain is nothing but a linear linked list where all the pointers are replaced by hash pointers. That means you have a sequence of block, each block has its own data part and short hash or the short summary of the entire content of the block after it and so on and like that you have a short summary of the entire Block chain or the entire linked list, which is nothing but the hash value of the head data block. (Refer Slide Time: 28:44) So, this Block chain, it gives you a very nice data structure. Namely, it helps you to instantiate what we call a tamper-evident log. What exactly is a tamper-evident log? It is a log data structure, namely it will store lots of information and it should be a dynamic data structure in the sense it should allow you to append data to the log. That means whatever existing log you have, you can append data to it. And apart from that any change in that log or the existing log should be deductible. So let us see whether we can instantiate this tamper-evident log using Block chain. So it turns out that indeed, we can use the Block chain to instantiate tamper-evident log and the idea here is that we can use the head hash pointer as a short summary for the entire log. That means I do not need to store the entire log.So, at this layer he has to give me the binary contents here, at the second layer he has to give me the binary contents of this node, at the third layer he has to give me the binary contents of this node, and at the last layer basically he has to give me the i th the data block, in this case the sixth data block. That means, if you have a Merkle tree where there are 2k number of data blocks and if you want to fetch only a particular data block i th data block, then the number of binary strings which the person has to give back to me is of order k only, not 2k and that makes this data structure very powerful. You can prove the membership of certain data blocks in the whole tree without actually supplying the whole tree. Just supplying logarithmic number of information, it suffices for an entity to prove whether a certain data block is present in the tree or not. So, that brings me to the end of this lecture. Just to summarize, in this lecture we had seen some of the applications of hash functions. We have seen how the hash of a file can or the hash of an entity can serve at its unique identifier assuming finding collisions are difficult, and this concept has got tremendous applications. Major application is in the context of hash pointers, where we can replace all the data structures based on standard pointers by hash pointers. We had seen how Block chains can be used as our tamper-evident log based on this principle.
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